Moral Hazard and Asymmetric Information in IPO Underpricing

Document Type : Review Paper

Authors

1 Assistant Professor of Accounting Department of Mazandaran University

2 Student of Islamic Azad University Ayatollah Amoli

Abstract

If the percentage of institutional shareholders increase, the moral hazard of company and then underpricing of IPO would decrease, because institutional shareholders provide certain requirements related volume, price and mechanism of IPO that can effect on of IPO underpricing. IPO is done by companies that market has little know about management and ownership of these companies. Outside investors has little information at time of IPO about these companies relative to other companies. In contrast, inside shareholders has more information. Thus there is asymmetry information between issuing company and potential investors.The purpose of this study is that to explain the role of asymmetric information on IPO Underpricing and the role of moral hazard as one of the most important aspects of Information Asymmetry on IPO Underpricing should be determined. The researchers measured information asymmetry by various factors such as underwriter reputation, ownership structure and the stock market that the firm be offered, and moral hazard is measured by management ownership during the lockup length. Study empirical show that moral hazard and asymmetric information is the most important factors of affecting on IPO Underpricing.

Keywords

References

اسکندری، مجید، (1389)، درجه ریسک‌پذیری بازارهای مختلف بورس و فرابورس، روزنامه دنیای اقتصاد، شماره 2663
سکات، ویلیام، (1388)، "تئوری حسابداری مالی"، جلد اول، ترجمه علی پارسائیان، انتشارات ترمه.
اسماعیل زاده مقری، علی، جلیلی، محمد، زند و عباس آبادی، عباس، (1389)، بررسی تأثیر حاکمیت شرکتی بر کیفیت سود در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، مجلهحسابداریمدیریت، سال سوم، شمارههفتم، صص 79-91
 

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History

  • Receive Date: 14 June 2018
  • Accept Date: 14 June 2018

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