بررسی تاثیر نقدشوندگی سهام بر مدیریت سود بر مبنای اقلام تعهدی اختیاری و بر مبنای اقلام واقعی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناس ارشد حسابداری، دانشگاه پیام نور، ایران، نویسنده مسئول

2 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری واحد تهران مرکز و عضو هیأت علمی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد سنندج، مرکز بانه، ایران

چکیده

نگرش کوتاه‌مدت مدیران، تمایل مدیران به افزایش ارزش سهام شرکت بدون در نظر گرفتن اهداف بلند مدت از طریق دستکاری در سودهای جاری است. در مطالعه حاضر اثر نقدشوندگی سهام بر مدیریت سود مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. در این راستا، از دو معیار مدیریت سود بر مبنای اقلام تعهدی اختیاری، مدیریت سود بر مبنای اقلام واقعی از طریق کاهش مخارج اختیاری به عنوان شاخص‌های شناسایی مدیرت سود استفاده شده است. نمونه پژوهش حاضر 91 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران برای دوره زمانی 1384-1393 می‌‌باشد. روش پژوهش جهت آزمون فرضیه اول مبتنی بر تکنیک پانل دیتا و روش داده‌های تلفیقی است، همچنین آزمون فرضیه دوم با استفاده از مدل اثرات ثابت مورد تجزیه و تحلیل قرار گرفته‌ است. بر اساس نتایج تحقیق حاضر، نقدشوندگی سهام دارای اثر منفی بر مدیریت سود برمبنای اقلام تعهدی اختیاری و از لحاظ آماری معنادار است. بنابراین می‌توان اظهار نمود که در شرکت‌هایی که سهام با نقدشوندگی بالا وجود دارد، مدیریت سود کمتر است. در واقع می‌توان اظهار کرد که نقدشوندگی سهام سبب تضعیف نگرش فرصت‌طلبانه مدیران شده و مانع از شکل‌گیری نگرش کوتاه‌مدت در مدیران خواهد شد. همچنین نتایج حاکی از عدم وجود ارتباط معنی‌دار بین نقدشوندگی سهام با مدیریت سود بر مبنای اقلام واقعی است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Survey of the Impact of Stock Liquidity and Earnings Management Based on Discretionary Accruals and the Actual Items

نویسندگان [English]

  • Kaveh Qaderi 1
  • Salah Al-Din Qaderi 2
1 Master of Accounting, Payame Noor University, Iran
2 Ph.D Student, Accounting Unit, Tehran Branch and member of the faculty of Islamic Azad University, Sanandaj Branch, Baneh Center, Iran
چکیده [English]

Managerial short-termism, or the desire to achieve a high stock price by inflating current earnings at the expense of long-term growth. In this study, the relationship between Stock liquidity and earning management is discussed. In this regard, to measure earning management were used two criteria discretionary accruals and the actual items through a reduction in discretionary spending. Sampling population of the present study includes 91 accepted companies at Tehran stock exchange and manufacturing parts in the time period of 2005 – 2014 and the method of panel-data have been used to analyzing. Based on the results of this study, the coefficient of stock liquidity is negative and significant. These results suggest that firms with higher levels of stock liquidity are less likely to manage their earnings. Actually, these findings provide that stock liquidity discourages opportunistic earnings management, thus mitigating managerial short-termism. Also, There may seem no relation between that stock liquidity and earnings management based on actual items.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Discretionary accruals
  • earnings management
  • Stock Liquidity
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