تبیین حاکمیت شرکتی با استفاده از تئوری اقتضائی: مسیر تحقیقات آتی

نوع مقاله : مقاله ترویجی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار، گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه ایلام، ایلام

2 دانشیار، گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

3 دانشیار گروه حسابداری دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران

چکیده

در طی سالیان دراز، تحقیقات حاکمیت شرکتی تلاش کرده‌اند مدلی را تدوین کنند که برای تمام شرکت‌ها و با اهداف مختلف سازگاری داشته باشد. تمرکز بیشتر این تحقیقات بر حداقل نمودن تضاد نمایندگی بین مالکان و مدیران بوده است. مشخصه مهم ادبیات مرسوم نمایندگی، تحقیق در زمینه وجود روابط کلی و جهان شمول بین سازوکارهای حاکمیت شرکتی و پیامدهای سازمانی بر مبنای منطق سیستم‌های بسته و با تمرکز بر هزینه‌های نمایندگی است. در دهه‌های گذشته بسیاری از محققین با این استدلال که تئوری نمایندگی کمتر به زمینه‌های محیط سازمانی می‌پردازد، نیاز به ارائه یک دیدگاه اقتضائی از حاکمیت شرکتی را مورد توجه قرار داده‌اند. پژوهش حاضر با رویکردی توصیفی و تحلیلی به تبیین حاکمیت شرکتی با استفاده از تئوری اقتضائی پرداخته است. در این راستا، در گام اول به توضیح تئوری نمایندگی و انتقادات وارد بر آن و سپس به ارائه مبانی تئوری اقتضائی و پیشینه تحقیقات حاکمیت شرکتی با استفاده از این تئوری پرداخته شده است. در پایان نیز، پیشنهاداتی در خصوص مسیر تحقیقات آتی در این حوزه، ارائه شده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Explaining Corporate Governance Using Contingency Theory: A Direction for Future Research

نویسندگان [English]

  • farshad sabzalipour 1
  • Mohammad Ali Aghaei 2
  • Sehar Sepasi 3
1 accounting, Literature and Humanities, ilam university, ilam, iran
2 Faculty member of TMU
3 Department of Accounting, Modares University, Iran, Tehran
چکیده [English]

Over the years, corporate governance research has been working to develop a model that is compatible for all companies and for various purposes. The focus of these research was minimizing agency conflict between owners and managers. One important characteristic of the traditional agency literature is to search for universal relationships between corporate governance and outcomes based on a “closed systems” logic centered on agency costs. In recent decades, many researchers have focused on the need to provide a view of corporate governance by arguing that agency theory less addresses the context of an organizational environment. The present paper, with descriptive and analytic approach, has explained corporate governance through contingency theory. In this regard, in first step, it explains agency theory and its criticisms and then presents the theoretical foundations of contingency theory and corporate governance literature using this theory. In the end, it will also provide suggestions on the direction of future research in this area.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Agency Theory
  • Contingency Theory
  • Corporate Governance
  • Organizational Contexts
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