ارتباط بین در دسترس بودن اطلاعات مالی با عملکرد و تغییر مدیرعامل بعد از اصلاحیه افشای اجباری اطلاعات شرکت‌های بورسی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حسابداری دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران

2 کارشناسی ارشد حسابداری دانشگاه پیام نور، واحد بین الملل قشم، ایران

چکیده

وجود اطلاعات شفاف یکی از ارکان اساسی پاسخگویی و تصمیم‌گیری‌های اقتصادی آگاهانه محسوب می‌شود. افشای اطلاعات توسط شرکت‌ها یکی از منابع مهم و ارزشمند اطلاعاتی برای سرمایه‌گذاران، اعتباردهندگان و سایرذینفعان است. سازو‌کارهای قانونی، دستورالعمل‌های مراجع ذی‌صلاح و یا استانداردهای حسابداری، موارد افشای اطلاعات را تعین نموده و شرکت‌ها را ملزم به رعایت آن می‌کنند. دستورالعمل اجرایی افشای اطلاعات شرکت‌های بورسی در اجرای بند 11 و 18 ماده 7 و ماده 45 قانون بازار اوراق بهادار جمهوری اسلامی ایران، در سال 1391 به تصویب رسید. هدف اصلی این پژوهش بررسی ارتباط بین در دسترس بودن اطلاعات مالی با عملکرد و تغییر مدیرعامل پس از تصویب این دستورالعمل است. فرضیه‌های پژوهش با استفاده از نمونه آماری شامل 140 شرکت پذیرفته شده در بورس تهران طی سال‌های 1388 تا 1396 و مبتنی بر روش رگرسیون خطی و لاجیت، تحلیل و بررسی گردید. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که پس از تصویب دستورالعمل افشاء، ارتباط بین عملکرد شرکت و در دسترس بودن اطلاعات کاهش یافته است، اما ارتباط بین نوسانات عملکرد شرکت و در دسترس بودن اطلاعات افزایش یافته است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان داد که پس از تصویب دستورالعمل افشاء، ارتباط بین نوسانات عملکرد شرکت و تغییر مدیرعامل افزایش یافته است، اما هیچ رابطه معنی‌داری بین عملکرد شرکت و تغییر مدیرعامل مشاهده نشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Relationship Between the Financial Information Availability to Performance and CEO Change After Mandatory Amendment of Information Disclosure of listed Companies

نویسندگان [English]

  • Nazanin Bashirimanesh 1
  • Hosein Mashayekhi 2
1 Assistant Professor of Accounting Department of Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran
2 Budget Manager/University of jiroft
چکیده [English]

The existence of transparent information is an essential element of accountability and informed economic decision-making. Disclosure of information by companies is one of the most important and valuable sources of information for investors, creditors and other stakeholders. Legal mechanisms, guidelines, or accounting standards define disclosure cases and require companies to comply with them. The executive instruction on the disclosure of information by listed companies in stock exchange in the implementation of paragraphs 11 and 18 of Article 7 and Article 45 of the Law on the Securities Market of the Islamic Republic of Iran was adopted in 1391. The main purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between the availability of financial information and the performance and change of CEO after the adoption of this instruction. The research hypotheses were analyzed by a statistical sample of 140 firms approved during the years 2009 to 2017 based on linear regression and Logit method. The research findings indicate that after the approval of the disclosure directive, the relationship between firm performance and availability of information has decreased, but the relationship between company performance fluctuations and availability of information has increased. The research findings showed that after the adoption of the disclosure directive, the relationship between the company's performance fluctuations and CEO change has increased, but there was no significant relationship between corporate performance and CEO change.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Disclosure Reforms
  • Information Availability
  • Performance Volatility
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