بررسی نقش تعدیل گر درصد مدیران غیرموظف بر رابطه بین فرصت‌های سرمایه گذاری و عملکرد مالی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار مدیریت دانشگاه گیلان،

2 دانشیار مدیریت دانشگاه گیلان،

3 کارشناسی ارشد مدیریت بازرگانی دانشگاه گیلان

چکیده

در تئوری نمایندگی، کنترل مهم ‌ترین وظیفه هیئت مدیره است. در این راستا حضور مدیران غیر موظف در ترکیب هیئت مدیره نقش ارزنده‌ای را در سازماندهی بهتر درونی و بهبود فرایندهای تصمیم‌ گیری و به تبع بهبود عملکرد شرکت ایفا می‌کند. هدف از این پژوهش بررسی نقش تعدیل گر مدیران غیر موظف بر رابطه بین فرصت‌های سرمایه‌ گذاری و عملکرد مالی شرکت‌های پذیرفته ‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. در این تحقیق اطلاعات مالی 85 شرکت پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران در طی دوره زمانی 1388 تا 1394 جمع‌آوری گردید. نتایج پژوهش حاکی از آن است که درصد مدیران غیرموظف در رابطه بین فرصت‌های سرمایه‌گذاری و عملکرد مالی نقش تعدیل گری ایفا می‌کند. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که مدیران غیر موظف با نظارت بیشتر، عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی و هزینه‌های نمایندگی را کاهش داده و از این طریق تأثیر فرصت‌های سرمایه‌گذاری بر عملکرد مالی را در شرکت های مورد مطالعه افزایش خواهد یافت.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Moderating Role of Non-executive Director Board Presence on the Relation between Investment Opportunity and Financial Performance

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohsen Akbari 1
  • Mohammad Hassan Gholizdeh 2
  • Mahsa Farkonda 3
1 Assistant Professor of Management, University of Guilan,
2 Associate Professor of Management of Guilan University
3 Master of Business Administration, University of Guilan
چکیده [English]

Control is the main task of managerial board, according to agency theory. Presence of non-executive director boards in firms' executive boards is very important in better internal organizing, improvement of decision making processes and consequently firms' performance.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the moderating role of non-executive director board presence on the relationship between investment opportunities and financial performance of the firms in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). In this research, data of 85 firms of Tehran Stock Exchange during years of 2010 - 2016 are gathered through panel data. The results show that board independence has a moderating role on the relationship between investment opportunities and financial performance of these firms. Results in the last part of paper, reveal that non-executive director board monitoring reduces information asymmetry and agency costs that leads to stronger effect of investment opportunities on financial performance of the firms in our study.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Non-executive Director Board
  • financial performance
  • Investment Opportunity
  • Market to Book Assets Ratio
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